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Abstract 
 
Critique is a driving force not only for the development of political ideas and concepts, but also for 
protecting humane and democratic politics against the perils of epistemic and political ideologies. 
Yet, while there is much debate about the question of ‘What is critique?’, the conditions of critique 
appear largely under-reflected in International Politics and the Social Sciences more generally. This 
paper goes beyond the question of what critique in politics and social science might consist of and 
holds that critique is not an end in itself, but rather requires a yardstick to discuss and judge its ge-
nerative conditions, i.e., its foundation, legitimization, and direction that it must pertain to be mea-
ningful. The following paper will explore the oeuvres of 20th-century political and social theorists 
Hans J. Morgenthau, Herbert Marcuse, and Eric Voegelin and argues that the three principles of 
perspectivity’, negation’, and ‘noesis’ that can be concluded from their work provide such 
generative conditions of critique, practically leading to a novel policy framework of the non-
irreversibility of politics. 
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Introduction 
 
Critique seems to assume that we are in a better or superior position than the author, text, or 
politician that is criticized; but what justifies this assumption? In researching this question, this 
paper attempts to go beyond the question of ‘What is critique?’,1 but asks what enables and 
legitimizes the social scientist, the philosopher, the politician, finally every one of us, to be critical. 
While Herbert Marcuse’s, Hans J Morgenthau’s, and Eric Voegelin’s work is each deficient in 
explicating their conditions of critique, together and combined they promise to hold important 
insights to elaborate conditions of critique and of humane politics. 
Even though the work of Morgenthau, Marcuse, and Voegelin does not explicitly reflect upon 
the conditions of (their) critique, their oeuvres nevertheless hold crucial insights for the formulation 
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of knowledge and its practical application. These insights become visible as conditions of critique 
when elaborated through intertextual analysis. An intertextual triangulation of their views on 
knowledge production and political/social practice, that takes into account their different 
approaches and lessons while at the same time interrelating them, thus promises significant findings 
about the under-researched question of what enables, legitimates, and directs critique. 
While Marcuse argues that in modern (advanced industrial) societies the individual would be 
bereft of his/her ability to critique because technological developments would work against human 
liberation and the human condition as means of control and command, he himself then presents a 
whole book (and more) of and on social and political critique.2 But what are the conditions of his 
critique and the possibilities he offers? His notion of dialectic negation seems fundamental and 
stimulating for the study of conditions of critique. 
His contemporary Morgenthau was certainly not shy of critiquing politicians and colleagues, 
in publications, speeches, and political action. Indeed, he was very much an alerting voice and 
public intellectual against, academically, positivist science, a-historical inquiry, and dehumanizing 
tendencies of a priori-rationalizations in the social sciences; and, politically, of modern ideologies 
of social planning, consumer society, and national power politics.3 We find in Morgenthau’s 
writings, however, even less reflection on the conditions that enabled his critique than in Marcuse. 
However, when taking into account, too, his unpublished work, we can elaborate the notion of the 
contingency of political knowledge and practice as, too, the conditions of his own arguments.  
And Voegelin, probably the least known to students of International Politics, is often 
associated with conservative scholarship, shares, however, many critiques with Critical Theory and 
Classical Realism as of modern reason, of the idea of an autonomous individual, and of nationalism 
and political ideologies (even if all three arrived at different answers)4. But it also needs to be asked 
here: what enables his critique? And what thoughts can we find in his work with regard to the 
question of conditions of critique? His specific contribution – which comes to full fruition under the 
present inquiry when linked and combined with the notions of perspectivity (à la Morgenthau) and 
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dialectic negation of knowledge (à la Marcuse) – lies in the embedding of ‘negative’, 
deconstructing knowledge by means of perspectivity and negation into a ‘positive’ re-articulation of 
humanity and political order through the notion of ‘noesis’. 
More specifically, Morgenthau’s idea of the temporal and spatial contingency and 
perspectivity of knowledge (a concept that he develops in reference to Karl Mannheim’s concept of 
“Standortgebundenheit”), combined with the notion of a dialectical negation of arguments as 
discussed by Marcuse (as ‘thesis’ and ‘anti-thesis’), need to be framed and embedded within the 
concept of ‘noesis’ (i.e., apperceiving self-reflectivity) as interpreted by Voegelin. The triangulation 
of perspectivity and dialectical negation with political ‘noesis’ provides a catalogue of principles 
that prevent epistemic and political ideologies and safeguard humane and pluralistic politics.5 This 
triad translates into four practical propositions for research and politics that found a new normative 
approach to a politics of non-irreversibility alluded to in the Conclusions. 
 
The argument 
 
This paper develops the following argument: while there are two epistemological requirements that 
enable critique – the idea of the conditionality and space-time-contingency of political knowledge 
and the idea of negation – there seems to be the necessity to complement both with the notion of 
‘noesis’, i.e., the apperceiving reflectivity of critique on its own structures, reason, and experience. 
While “Standortgebundenheit” and negation rest on temporal ontology, suggesting the ‘transfor-
mativity’, rather than identity of social relations and political order,6 we need to ask the subsequent 
question of what kind of referent ‘object’ “Standortgebundenheit” and negation relate to and need 
to resonate with. If knowledge is perspectivist, negated, and temporal, i.e., of deconstructing 
quality, what then is the epistemological yardstick for rearticulating, creating, and practicing 
political order?  
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Voegelin’s notion of ‘noesis’ provides us with a fruitful answer, drafting theoretical and 
political-strategic openness towards and apperceiving reflection upon perspectivism and negation as 
the condition of humanity and humane politics to prevent epistemic and political ideologies. It thus 
triangulates perspectivism and negation and incorporates them into a catalogue of conditions of 
critique. Keeping open, and if necessary creating and recovering unoccupied (by predisposed 
political ideas, practices, structures, and institutions), deliberative spaces protects humane politics. 
In sum, the triangulation of ‘noesis’, dialectic negation, and “Standortgebundenheit” are much more 
than normative thinking about politics: they not only provide theoretical principles, but offer 
indispensable tools for the critique of political claims and practices when and as soon as they violate 
and harm humane and democratic (i.e., as will be argued in the Conclusions, reversible) politics. 
Thus, they deliver necessary critical standards of humanity vis-à-vis political theory and political 
practices, finally, too, for our own arguments and practices. 
 
Structure of the Paper 
 
These expositions result in the following structure of paper: in a first step, I will discuss the idea of 
the conditionality and space-time-contingency of knowledge and political theory in Morgenthau. In 
a second step, I will then elaborate on the idea of dialectical negation in Marcuse. In a third step, I 
will elaborate Voegelin’s notion of ‘noesis’. In a fourth section, I will bring these discussions 
together in the light of the main question of conditions of critique and conclude the following four 
practical consequences for research and politics: 
(1) Research concepts and practices need to be framed in relation to the historical and cultural 
circumstances of the researcher and the “object”-under-study, while there is no independent, 
‘objective’ vantage point for the development and application of concepts and research strategies. 
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(2) Every research process and research finding needs to incorporate the possibility of 
alternative views and suggest its own refutability. Accordingly, it has to imply in such cases a 
discreet and diplomatic option for the normative and political practice that might result from itself.  
(3) Research in international politics and the social sciences more generally has to resonate 
with human experience, the apperception of humanity, and ‘the person’,7 rather than with policies 
of progress, performance measurement, social engineering, and institutional design as if these were 
ends in themselves.  
(4) With regard to practical politics, the claim arises of the non-irreversibility of political 
practice, i.e., politics shall not result in consequences that are irreparable and unalterable. This 
aspect will be elaborated as an instrument to assess and evaluate concrete policies, connecting to, 
and the same time providing innovative ground for, contemporary theoretical and policy debates 
such as on energy, environmental, and security issues.8 
 
On the perspectivity of knowledge and political theory 
 
There are several threads throughout his oeuvre where Morgenthau points out that all theory and 
theoretical analysis are contingent upon factors the occurrences of which we had no knowledge of 
and consequences which we could not foresee. Even if prominently communicated in The Concept 
of the Political (2012 [1933]), it was not before a talk at the University of Maryland in 1961, with 
the title ‘The Intellectual and Political Functions of a Theory of International Relations’ (here 
1962b), that Morgenthau used the precise term ‘standortgebunden’ to describe the spatial and tem-
poral conditionality of political and social theory and knowledge. The adjective ‘standortge-
bunden’, and the noun ‘Standortgebundenheit’, are from sociologist Karl Mannheim and is a key 
concept of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge (1936; 1984). It describes the idea that social theo-
ry always depends upon the social and political environment in which it has been formulated and in 
which it is supposed to operate. This term endorses a perspectivist understanding of an object re-
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vealing characteristics of itself only in relation to concepts and perspectives applied. Accordingly, 
all social and political knowledge is historical and spatial. In addition to his statements from The 
Concept of the Political and in ’The Intellectual and Political Functions’ we find in the Third of 
Morgenthau’s ‘Six Principles of Political Realism’9 no less than three paragraphs which most ex-
plicitly explain this position in relation to the concepts of power and interest: 
 
(The) kind of interest determining political action (…) depends upon the political and cultural con-
text within which foreign policy is formulated. The goals (…) pursued by nations (…) run the 
whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue. 
 
The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its content and the manner of its use are de-
termined by the political and cultural environment (…) Power covers all social relationships (…).  
 
What is true of the general character of international relations is also true of the nation state as the 
ultimate point of reference of contemporary foreign policy (…) (The) contemporary connection be-
tween interest and the nation state is a product of history, and is therefore bound to disappear in the 
course of history. 
 
Morgenthau’s epistemological position of ‘Standortgebundenheit’ coincides with his criticism of 
the rationalist and positivist ideas of historical progress, techniques of social engineering, and the 
rationality of the ‘Age of Reason’ which all require a universal standpoint of knowledge from 
which to derive these ideas and respective strategies for their realization. Further to his published 
oeuvre – such as Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (1946), ‘The State of Political Science’ (here 
1962a) or his The Concept of the Political (see also above in footnote 2) –, we have additional evi-
dence from his 1952-lecture ‘Philosophy of International Relations’, particularly that of 31st Janu-
ary, as well as most strikingly from letters between Morgenthau and Karl Gottfried Kindermann 
from the 1960s.10 
We thus recognize his critical disassociation from three prominent theories of knowledge: 
First, he is critical about a rationalist approach to overcome the confinements of human knowledge 
through the construction of knowledge of the external world out of indubitable principles possessed 
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inherently by the mind itself, the most indubitable of such principles being Descartes’s ‘Cogito ergo 
sum’. This kind of rationalist knowledge would be invulnerable to any kind of scepticism and is 
supposed to represent the basis of all further knowledge about the world.11 We recognize here the 
belief that the existence of objects outside the self can be based on and deduced from the mind’s 
awareness of its own existence, thereby allowing to dispel all doubts and insecurities about 
knowledge and accomplishing epistemological security regarding the existence, constitution, and 
character of the world (also called ‘dualism’; see Holt et al., 1960: 154). Morgenthau promotes a 
position that is critical about this epistemological paradigm, especially with regard to its a priori, 
experience-independent claims and assumptions about the world (see Behr, 2013). Political realism 
in Morgenthau is hence an anti-Cartesian position which recognizes the mind-independent existence 
of an empirical world and human agency within this world, but which does not, however, claim se-
cure and definite knowability of, and analytical accessibility to, this world. His realism is aware that 
there exist factualities about the world and its penetrating principles that are mind-independent, but 
that those ‘facts’ and principles, however, adopt different empirical meanings throughout history 
and cultures; they are conditioned and shaped by time and space-contingent constellations created 
through human mind, perception, imagination, and agency.12 This epistemological position recog-
nizes perennial forces which penetrate political reality, but requires for their understanding context-
specific explanations and hermeneutic methods; in short, it is “Erfahrungswissenschaft” that pro-
claims universal epistemological positions while at the same time demanding temporally and spa-
tially sensitive explanations of particular manifestations of those perennial forces. 
Second, Morgenthau is also adverse to an empiricism which would base knowledge about the 
political world on merely sensually conceived impressions and which would rely in its assertions 
about the world on (ostensibly) mind-independent data bruta, i.e. methodologically on positivist 
quantifications and measurements of social and political phenomena, built on the hope that through 
inductive logic there may be some day some kind of spill-over from data collection to knowledge 
(see also the discussions in Holt et al. 1960: 152). 
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And third, Morgenthau’s epistemology, because it recognizes the mind-independent, however 
spatio-temporally qualified status of things real, ‘strips mind of its pretensions, but not of its value 
or greatness (…) Realism dethrones the mind, [and at the same time] recognizes mind as chief in 
the world’ (Alexander 1960: 186). We here further recognize an anti-idealist position against the 
belief in a ‘world in which there exist only minds’ (Holt et al. 1960: 154, 155). Politically speaking, 
and in sharp contrast to Morgenthau’s position, idealism would presume the fabricability and shap-
ability of the world without, as he argues, taking into account to a sufficiently high degree the con-
cepts of power, interest, and morality and the ‘factual’, but empirically divergent constellations, 
which these concepts make cognizable. He notes: 
 
For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It as-
sumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the 
political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts (…) Yet examination of 
the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy [here, we rec-
ognize Friedrich Nietzsche’s “facts are stupid”13], we must approach political reality with a kind of 
rationale outline, a map that suggests to us (…) possible meanings of foreign policy (from the First 
of his ‘Six Principles …’).  
 
This ‘map’14 for the rational (and very purposefully Morgenthau does not write rationalist) concep-
tualization of reality is provided by the concepts of power, interest, and morality and their interplay. 
These concepts, which condensate in his mantra ‘interest defined in terms of power’ (from the Sec-
ond of his ‘Six Principles …’), are such a rational conceptualization. They do not express an onto-
logical statement of how the world ‘is’, even if they became read, or better misread as such by In-
ternational Relations mainstream time and again. In Morgenthau’s words they can rather be under-
stood as a ‘signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international 
politics’ (ibid.). Here it becomes clear that this sentence articulates epistemological categories 
which ‘provide the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be 
understood’ (ibid). And this is precisely not a subordination of political reality under either rational-
ist, empiricist, or idealist principles Another quote in this context is further instructive for the epis-
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temological character of the concepts of power and interest: ‘The concept of interest defined as 
power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer’ (emphasis by the authors; from the Second 
of his ‘Six Principles …’).15  
In order to further understand epistemology in Morgenthau – and ‘realism’ is to be understood 
as epistemology,16 not as an ontology of international politics as often misread – we need to empha-
size his statements that empiricist and positivist accounts would indeed ‘become a pretentious col-
lection of trivialities’ (1962a: 27). He insists that empirics has to be given social and political mean-
ing (from his First of his ‘Six Principles …’) and that, as he notes elsewhere and much earlier (in 
195l; here 1962a), ‘the empiricist commitment of modern political science to practical ends [i.e. as a 
‘problem-solving’ empiricist science] (…) has powerfully contributed to its decline as theory’ (25). 
This criticism resonates with his argumentation against analogies between natural and social scienc-
es and humanities, arguing that ‘(to) make susceptibility to quantitative measurement the yardstick 
of the scientific character of the social sciences (…) is to deprive these sciences of that very orienta-
tion which is adequate to the understanding of their subject matter’ (1962a: 27). It is obvious that 
these arguments vehemently targeted the increasing scientism of American political science in the 
1940s and 1950s, and thus were against the emerging mainstream in the discipline of which the sub-
discipline of International Relations was by no way exempted.17 But what would be epistemologi-
cally adequate? We can understand Morgenthau’s epistemology as a middle-ground between empir-
icism and rationalism; he notes:  
 
While it is unnecessary to argue the case for the need for factual information, it ought to be no more 
necessary to argue that factual description is not science, but a mere (…) preparation for the scien-
tific understanding of the facts (1962a: 26). 
 
Therefore, realist epistemology consists in the acknowledgment of the existence of mind-
independent political realities in which, however, the mind plays a paramount role in that these 
mind-independent realities become meaningful only through theoretical understanding. Further to 
this, these ‘facts’ are not to be seen as eternally the same, but have to be recognized in their spatio-
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temporal constellations. This fundamental position of realist epistemology posits that both the 
thing-being-observed and the observer mutually influence and constitute each other in (the world 
of) social sciences.18 This mutual constitution of observer and the thing-being-observed was self-
evident for Morgenthau who was familiarized with this epistemological position through readings 
of Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey, Georg Simmel, Alfred Schütz, and Karl Mannheim.19  
 
Dialectic negation 
 
The second principle of critique that shall be introduced is the idea of dialectic negation as we know 
it from critical theory. I will draw mainly on Herbert Marcuse’s work since this principle 
communicates most clearly from his writings, particularly from his Negations: Essays in Critical 
Theory (1968). At first, however, we have to emphasize the anti-metaphysical argument of critical 
theory that is, according to its self-understanding, one of the main differences between ‘traditional’ 
and ‘critical’ theory.20 This anti-metaphysical position is understood and targeted against the 
metaphysical speculation about an essence and telos of things (history, society, man, etc.). Against 
such speculation, critical theorists stress the importance of history, i.e., historical experience and 
historical inquiry. In the Introduction to his One-dimensional Man, when addressing the question of 
what critical theory is, Marcuse famously describes critical theory as the attempt to elaborate 
historical alternatives to actual pathways of societal developments; 21  and in Negations, he writes: 
 
Through [critical theory], given facts are understood as appearances whose essence can be 
comprehended only in the context of particular historical tendencies aiming at a different form of 
reality. The theory’s historical interest enter constitutively into its conceptual scheme and makes the 
transcendence of ‘facts’ towards their essence critical and polemic’ (1968: 71). 
 
This takes us to the core of critical theory and its notion of dialectic negation. To find out those 
historical alternatives and possibilities of its realization, including reasons for why other pathways 
of historical development have dominated, is linked to the ideas of emancipation and liberation. The 
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awareness and elaboration of historical alternatives and potentialities underlines man’s potential 
role as creator of his social, political, and economic conditions. Here, Marcuse, at least, speaks to us 
as if he were driven by the idea to rescue some of the Enlightenment promises which have been so 
pessimistically dismantled by his peers Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer.22 
The search for historical alternatives within critical theory and Marcuse is guided by the idea 
that there actually is and would have been an alternative to every actual event, thus for every event 
there is a potentiality of being-otherwise. This road to permanent and always possible negation and 
alternatives takes us to the notion of ‘dialectic’ that is so paradigmatic for critical theory.23 Marcuse 
writes: 
 
Materialist theory thus transcends the given state of fact and moves towards a different potentiality, 
proceeding from immediate appearance to the essence that appears in it. But here appearance and 
essence become members of a real antithesis arising from the particular historical structure of the 
social process of life. The essence of man and of things appears within that structure; what men and 
things could genuinely be appears in “bad”, “perverted” form. At the same time, however, appears 
the possibility of negating this perversion and realizing in history that which could be. This 
antagonistic character of the historical process as it is today turns the opposition of essence and 
appearance into a dialectical relationship and this relationship into an object of the dialectic.24 
 
As we can see here, the idea of dialectic and negation does not only relate to materialistic, historical 
events, thus to ‘historical materialism’, but also to the awareness and consciousness of the 
theoretician. The theoretician not only studies historical ‘realities’ and ‘potentialities’, but needs to 
be aware of, and to build-in his/her analysis, a dialectic of the argument. The relation between 
‘thesis’ and ‘anti-thesis’ and their permanent forward-drive is of both materialistic and intellectual 
character. This means for the critical theorist that he/she needs to always be aware of the potential 
and actual negation of the own argument and should even push and develop the own argument 
towards its own negation. In ‘Traditional and critical theory’, Horkheimer briefly reflects upon the 
role of the critical theorist and it is interesting to see how he sees this role; he writes: 
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(The person of the theoretician) exercises an aggressive critique not only against the conscious 
defenders of the status quo, but against distracting, conformist, or Utopian tendencies within his 
own household. (1999: 214) 
 
And Marcuse notes in relation to the mutual relation of dialectic as having a historical-material and 
intellectual character at the same time: 
 
The tension between potentiality and actuality, between what man and things could be and what 
they are in fact, is one of dynamic focal points of this theory of society. It sees therein not a 
transcendental structure of Being and an immutable ontological difference, but a historical 
relationship which can be transformed in this life by real men; the incongruity of potentiality and 
actuality incites knowledge to become part of the practice of transformation.’ (1968: 69) 
 
He goes even further and, close to being a metaphysician himself,25 argues that the theoretician is in 
a position to experience historical potentialities that have never been realized. The question is, how? 
This envisioning seems only possible through a dialectic forward-development of the own 
theoretical argument and analysis that negates itself as soon as it is made. An indeed this seems to 
be the idea when he writes: ‘Reality is overcome by being comprehended as the mere possibility of 
another reality’ (1968: 83). Although I do not want to elaborate on inner contradictions of 
Marcuse’s arguments, there is one aspect that nevertheless needs to be mentioned as it appears very 
important to Marcuse and critical theory more generally. In Negations he writes with regard to the 
theory-practice relation of critical theory: 
 
What, however, if the development outlined by the theory does not occur? What if the forces that 
were to bring about the transformation are suppressed and appear to be defeated? Little as the 
theory’s truth is thereby contradicted, it nevertheless appears then in a new light which illuminates 
new aspects and elements of its object’ (1968: 142) 
 
Irrespective of this absurdity, we can record that the notion of dialectic negation provokes the 
theoretician, finally everyone, to be aware of the permanent negation and counter-possibility of 
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one’s own argument, historically and theoretically. This notion therefore includes the necessity of 
permanent self-criticality (as either a concurrent aspect within or procedural aspect subsequent to 
one’s own argument and action). This resembles Jacques Derrida’s notion of erasure and translates 
in the proposition of self-refutability.26 
 
The notion of ‘noesis’ 
 
The third notion that shall be developed here as a principle of conditions of critique is the notion of 
‘noesis’ as developed by Voegelin. He elaborates this notion going back to the Greek philosopher 
Plato and his dialogue Sophistes where Plato distinguishes a philosopher’s and a statesman’s 
knowledge from mere opinion (doxa), with knowledge as the superior and true from of wisdom 
compared to arbitrary and opinionated rhetoric.27 But what is ‘noesis’ exactly about and how does it 
relate to the triangulation of concepts for the elaboration of conditions of critique? To the second 
part of this question first because it relates to the argument of this paper: ‘noesis’ shall provide us 
with the direction that critique shall take after the deconstructive, though utterly important notions 
of perspectivity/contingency and negation. ‘Noesis’ is thus supposed to help us articulating a 
principle for the normative reconstruction of politics after critique. But while ‘noesis’ provides 
normative direction, this direction needs again to be qualified by the two intrinsic characteristics of 
knowledge of perspectivity/contingency and negation. The normative (reconstructive) articulation 
of politics thus needs a mechanism of critique, consisting of perspectivity and negation that is built-
in this normative articulation itself, just as critique needs normative direction to not become 
redundant or arbitrary as end in itself.28 But what does Voegelin mean by ‘noesis’? 
First, ‘noesis’ is an intellectual operation that critically reflects upon the degree to which 
political order, its institutions, and its (primarily linguistic, but generally all kind of) symbolizations 
correspond to humanity, the latter being imagined by Voegelin as the anthropological constitution 
of mankind. Thus, ‘noesis’ is a device of reflection and political judgment. What is to be judged, is 
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the question of whether, or not, politics is open towards humanity and human experience. Put 
differently, ‘noesis’ is about the critical consciousness and awareness (called ‘apperception’ by 
Voegelin and in social psychology) of whether, or not, politics violates or apprehends humanity. 
But how and as what is humanity imagined? 
Voegelin refers to an intellectual figure that appears in many different philosophical 
movements, such as mainly neo-Catholic and neo-Aristotelian, but also post-modern philosophies 
and critical theory, but that be summarized in its modern articulations as anti-Enlightenment 
thinking. This figure is called by Voegelin in Aristotelian language the ‘divine ground of 
existence’29 and perceives human existence as tension between all kind of questions that are neither 
tangible, nor answerable; they appear sometimes not even as effable.30 Such intangibilities and 
ineffabilities are not, as they would be perceived from linear, teleological worldviews (such as the 
three epistemologies of rationalism, empiricism, and idealism criticized above by Morgenthau), a 
deficiency of a particular dark-age, or numb context, or not yet fully developed consciousness. They 
are rather indicating the fundamental human condition of intellectual and practical limitation; i.e., 
there will always be unanswerable questions of human and political life, and subsequently 
uncontrollable and non-manageable political conditions and consequences. According to Voegelin, 
this is to be respected (apperceived) and not to be violated by knowledge claims that pretend to 
have respective answers. To give an example: we cannot know, as Voegelin argues, and we will 
never know the meaning of history. If we thought we would and pretended to know, we fall victim 
to ideologies, their one-sided knowledge claims, and their promises of Eden.31 ‘The refusal to 
apperceive’, Voegelin notes, ‘has become […] the central concept for the understanding of 
ideological aberrations and deformations’ (Voegelin, 2006: 122).32 Subsequently, it is crucial for 
human politics to be aware of the tension of human beings’ existence as living and participating in a 
spectrum of intangibilities and ineffabilities and to not attempt to dissolve this tension by claiming 
final answers and acting upon them and their assumptions respectively. Voegelin writes: 
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These experiences of participation in various areas of reality constitute the horizon of existence in 
the world. The stress lies on experiences of reality in the plural, being open to all of them and 
keeping them in balance. This is what I understood as the philosopher’s attitude, and this is the 
attitude I found in the open existence of all great philosophers … To restore this openness of reality 
appeared to me to be the principal task of philosophy’ (Voegelin, 2006: 98). 
 
The awareness and consciousness of such tension as the fundamental human condition is what 
Voegelin calls ‘apperception’. Thus, apperception results from the experience and awareness of the 
human condition. Further to this, apperception can recapture humanity through this awareness and 
its emphasis in case of politics that are not open to the human condition, thus ideological. In this 
case, one should speak of re-awareness of the human condition through apperception and ‘noesis’;33 
we read in Voegelin: 
 
Recapturing reality in opposition to its contemporary deformation requires a considerable amount of 
work. One has to reconstruct the fundamental categories of existence, experience, consciousness, 
and reality. One has at the same time to explore the technique and structure of the deformations that 
clutter up the daily routine; and one has to develop the concepts by which existential deformation 
and its symbolic expression can be categorized (Voegelin, 2006: 121). 
 
What results from this? The result from this is a twofold practical-political consequence; its second 
part is what provides us the normative direction of critique and political agency. First, any politics 
that attempts to, or actually does, violate the human condition, i.e., that claims answers to existential 
intangibilities/ineffabilities and implements respective political strategies that promise any kind of 
ultimate resolution, are to be resisted and rebelled against;34 and second, humane politics, or politics 
that apperceives and is aware of the human condition, aims at allowing a diversity and plurality of 
expressions and symbolizations of the human condition, i.e., expressions and symbolizations of the 
search for answers to ultimate questions of political life without, however, providing answers to 
such questions. The thus concluding norm for directing critique and for political action is the 
creation of openness and of free spaces where such expressions and symbolizations can flourish. 
We can call these spaces ideal-typically democratic or republican spaces, or just spaces of 
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humanity. We gain with Voegelin a language that does allow to regain (to ‘recapture’, as he says) 
normative thinking about humane politics without defining the contents of humanity.35 He notes: 
 
The core of political science is a noetic interpretation of man, society, and history that appears with 
the claim of critical knowledge of order vis-à-vis the order of that society in which, respectively, it 
emerges (Voegelin, 1990: 144). 
 
Triangulating the notions of contingency/perspectivity of knowledge, of dialectic negation, and of 
‘noesis’ leads to four propositions for a normative framework for humane and democratic politics. 
This will be discussed now. 
 
Four concluding propositions 
The social, political, and cultural embeddedness of the researcher 
The notion of the time-space-contingency of knowledge and of the socio-political embeddedness of 
the researcher as discussed by Morgenthau is a fundamental notion of a hermeneutic understanding 
of social and political research. This notion implies the idea of situated knowledge.36 It seems 
indispensable for meaningful critique to be aware of its own standpoint from, and embeddedness 
out of which, critique is being exerted. This seems to be for two reasons: the relation to, and 
perspective on, the ‘object’ criticized seems only to be adequate and suitable for critique when and 
if both the ‘criticizer’ and the ‘critiqued’ are understood in their individual contexts. For example, 
maybe self-evident, but still worthwhile to emphasize, an analysis and critique of a specific foreign 
policy that does not take into account domestic social and political rationales and conditions behind 
that policy is not as valid, meaningful, and powerful as a critique and analysis that does. But further 
to this, critique should also reflect upon the standpoint of the criticiser. Thus, from the notion of 
time-space-contingency of knowledge follows the social, political, and cultural situatedness of the 
researcher and the ‘object-under-study’ and therefore the perspectivity of critique as one of its 
conditions. 
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A research’s self-criticality and self-refutability 
The notion of dialectic negation leads, too, to a theoretical and practical proposition. This 
proposition holds that there is always another, a next viewpoint and thus no absolute certainty 
about, and finality of, one’s own theoretical view and practice. Consequently, this proposition leads 
to the necessity of an inherent and permanent criticality towards own theories and practices. In its 
further consequence, it reasons an intrinsic awareness of the refutability of one’s theoretical view 
and practice. This might be because of concrete historical alternatives to actual political and social 
developments or because of counter-arguments to theoretical suggestions; however, this proposition 
also includes the normative moment that the theoretician and the politician should always procure 
for and anticipate alternatives. This critical-theory demand resembles the practical consequences of 
the phenomenological notion of the ‘project-in-draft’-character of every theory and action 
(according to Alfred Schütz) as well as the notions of ‘différance’ and erasure in Jacques Derrida: 
the opposite is inherent in and authentic to everything, thus identity as linear and coherent being-
with-oneself is an illusion; every being is transformative and bears within it its own contradiction.37  
 
Social sciences/humanities and the apperception of humanity 
While both previous propositions of embeddedness/situatedness/perspectivity and of self-criticality/ 
self-refutability are as conditions of critique “only” meaningful in a deconstructive function, the 
notions of apperception and ‘noesis’ deliver normative standards for rearticulating and 
reconstructing political knowledge and order. Saying this, does not belittle the importance and 
relevance of the former, however, points to the necessity of a rearticulating and reconstructive 
moment in theory and practice. Critique needs direction to be meaningful. This seems to be a 
further condition of critique for two reasons: first, to direct the critique itself because critique is not 
an end in itself, but serves some purpose. In short, critique is less meaningful if it were only about 
undoing a theoretical or practical position without pointing a way out after deconstruction. 
However, this requires explicit normativity; but how to frame and specify such normativity? 
Second, the critiqued is left in a better position when he/she is being suggested theoretical and/or 
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practical alternatives and visions. Thus, the question also seems to be about the normativity for this 
reconstruction, bearing in mind that this normativity, as argued above, needs to be qualified against 
the previous notions of self-criticality/self-refutability and contingency/perspectivity. Only then is 
the triangulation (as mentioned in the beginning of this paper) as the structure of the argument 
presented here about conditions of critique fulfilled. Voegelin’s notion of ‘noesis’ seems to provide 
the explicit normativity required for the triangulation of conditions of critique. It provides the 
language that is needed to cast the direction of reconstruction and re-articulation – which are 
virtually one and the same process since, as Derrida and Lyotard emphasize, every deconstruction is 
in itself the re-articulation of a new narrative that is genuinely normative.38 Therefore, the claim to 
deconstruct without normativity is nonsense.  
The notion and language of ‘noesis’ tries to articulate humanity as the normative direction of 
critique. Without defining the content of humanity and humane politics – this would violate the two 
previous notions of self-criticality and self-refutability and contingency as well as the anthropology 
underlying the notion of ‘noesis’ itself – ‘noesis’ does stress the indispensable and major status of 
human experience, including its contradictions, ambiguities, “intangibilities”, and “ineffables” 
before and paramount to all questions of institutional design, policy arrangements, and state 
sovereignty. This does not hold that these questions were unimportant, rather than that they need to 
follow and serve humane ends and experience. Put differently: political order in all its aspects needs 
to resonate with human experience – that is always historical, social, political, cultural, thus 
context-specific and situated – and ultimately serves society, not being an end in itself and 
developing a life independent of society, but for the purpose of ministering society. As was 
discussed and developed above, the resonance of political theory and political practice with 
humanity and human experience can and needs to be determined through deliberation that 
articulates and symbolizes its norms, desires, values etc. as well as through the creation and 
opening-up of fora for such deliberation and symbolization. Here, deliberation and symbolization 
do not follow any purpose apart from articulating itself, having been granted the function as 
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yardstick for the resonance of political order that needs to be both open for and reflective upon such 
deliberation and apperceiving of human experience and its casting within contradictions, 
ambiguities, intangibilities, and ineffabilities. Non-apperception and non-resonance arises whenever 
deliberation and symbolization and their open fora for expression are shut down, hindered to 
articulate, and violated through epistemic or political ideologies, i.e., one-sided knowledge claims, 
unilateralism in international politics, military and direct violence etc. in the worst and most 
obvious cases; and prohibitions to ask questions, censorship, including self-censorship, stereotypes 
and prejudices, a-historical assumptions and their rationalizations, etc. etc., in short, all forms of 
cultural and structural violence39 in more subtle cases.  
 
The Non-Irreversibility of politics 
In terms of politics, the triangulation of ‘noesis’, contingency/perspectivity, and self-criticality/self-
refutability results in the important policy framework of the non-irreversibility of policies. The idea 
that policies must not cause irreversible consequences is also implicit in the early discussions of 
environmental justice and generational accountability. The triangulation of conditions of critique 
results in a similar argument, however, theoretically differently (and I would argue more deeply) 
founded. First publications emerged in German academic debates under the term “Umweltgerech-
tigkeit” in the 1980s in the context of the emergence of the Green Party, then as ‘environmental 
justice’ in US and subsequently in UK debates from the 2000s to present-day. A fundamental 
difference to the argument developed here is, however, that whereas most debates on environmental 
justice40 assume accountability of environmental degradation to arise after it happened, thus in 
relation to the settling and elimination of consequences, the argument here holds that policies that 
lead to irreversible consequences are to be avoided in the first place. Contingency, refutability, and 
noetic apperception of theory and practices triangulate two conditions of human knowledge and 
practice (contingency; refutability) with a normative claim (apperception). This catalogue of 
(conditions of) critique identifies policies as ignorant of conditions intrinsic to knowledge and 
practice always when and if policies are conducted which are of non-irreversible consequences. 
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Such policies violate the principle of contingency and refutability and contradict the openness 
demanded by ‘noesis’, and are therefore to be seen as human hubris, rather than politics that 
resonates with human experience.41 
Political examples to illustrate this point are many: from international security politics and 
to the nuclear condition, to environmental exploitation, to energy politics, to all politics that include 
questions of and decisions over life and death, including humanitarian intervention, immigration 
and asylum politics, urban development, conflict resolution, etc. etc. The drafting of policies that 
are informed by and include their own (partial) reversibility appears as a dictum for humane politics 
and society, not only in terms of generational accountability, but also in terms of intrinsic 
conditions of human knowledge and agency. The ability to turn back the wheel of consequences 
that have been triggered by implementing or simply allowing certain politics to happen, or to 
prevent policies with irreversibly harming and destructive consequences in the first place appears as 
the only accountable political agency in times of political means that have the potential to destroy 
once and for all all of humankind. Examples of such political means are many; what comes to mind 
instantly are the still massively existing and intact nuclear weapon arsenals and respective conflict 
scenarios, global warming and environmental degradation, and the exploitation of finite energy 
resources.  
This links the arguments presented here to the aspect of crises and crises prevention. There 
might be typical crises phenomena as the result of Western modernity, as argued by Marcuse, 
Morgenthau, and Voegelin; however, the analysis of crises and the awareness of their causes is one 
thing, to reflect upon and possess eventually a practically applicable framework for agency-within-
crises and for possibly preventing crises is another. While the former seems epistemologically 
inevitable, but practically insufficient, the later seems politically necessary. The dictum of avoiding 
policy irreversibilities appears as such a framework. Saying this, several main questions arise for 
further research: How to define, specify, and assess irreversiblities? Also, at which scale and scope 
of consequences to speak of their irreversibility? These are questions for further elaboration. 
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To end with, and critical of, but inspired by Morgenthau: it is not enough to subscribe to an 
ethics of evil due to the impossibility of pure ethical behaviour42, but to possess a theoretical and 
practical framework for self-reflective, self-constraining, and moderate politics that attempts to 
procure the avoidance of evil in the first place. The triangulation of the three principles of 
contingency, self-refutability, and noetic apperception as conditions of critique appears as such an 
attempt. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1  This question what critique consists of is widely discussed, without, however, reflecting up-
on the conditions of (their) critique; see, for example, writings of and on Derrida, Foucault, 
Butler, Fraser, or the Habermas-Foucault debate. See also foundational texts on critique in 
philosophy and social theory Horkheimer (1999 [1937]), Horkheimer/Adorno (2002), but 
also Heidegger, primarily Being and Time (1962), ‘Identität und Differenz’ (2006) and ‘Zur 
Sache des Denkens’ (2007). 
2  See Marcuse (2002 [1964]) and (1968). 
3  See Morgenthau (1944), (1960), (1959a), (1955), (1945a), (1945b), (1962a), (1962b), 
(2004). 
4  See Voegelin particularly his Autobiographical Reflections (2006), “What is Political Reali-
ty?” (1990) and (1952). 
5  It would of course be misleading to claim that Morgenthau, Marcuse, and Voegelin were the 
only scholars whose oeuvres would make the arguments of perspectivity of knowledge, ne-
gation, and noesis, however, they seem to communicate from their work most pronounced, 
even if not explicitly introduced by them as conditions of critique, but more as theoretical 
claims, and not always in a self-applied manner. Their oeuvres nevertheless promise to fur-
nish important inspiration for the question at hand.  
6  For this argument, see further discussions in Behr (2014). 
7  See hereto The Primacy of Persons in Politics (2013). 
8  See my preliminary outlines of the argument in ‘Security Politics and Public Discourse: A 
Morgenthauian Approach’ (2013) and Behr and Roesch (2013). 
9  See in his Politics Among Nations from the 1954-edition onwards. 
10  See Hans J Morgenthau Archive, Law Library, Library of Congress Washington, Box 33. 
11  From his Mediationes (1996); see also ‘Descartes’ Epistemology’, Stanford Encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy; similar epistemological positions can be assigned to Spinoza and Leibniz 
(see ‘Rationalism vs. Empiricism’, ibid.). 
12  See for this fundamental realist epistemological position Feldman (1999) who writes: ‘The 
application of the general idea of context dependence to knowledge attributions is straight-
forward. What it takes for a knowledge (…) to be true can vary from context to context’ 
(1999: 93); see also Feldman (2001) and DeRose (2009). 
13  See Nietzsche (1980). Hereto, also interesting, is Emmanuel Lévinas’s argument that the 
‘purely empirical is that which received signification, not that gives it’ in his paper 'Meaning 
and Sense’ (1996: 38). 
14  Morgenthau used the metaphor of a ‘map’ frequently: see 1955, 1959a, 1959b, 1971. 
15  See here also Turner/Mazur (2009: 492): ‘The centrality of power and interest is not derived 
directly from the facts of international politics (...) Power and interest are made central by 
the standpoint around which we have chosen to organize our inquiries’. In their interesting 
and in many parts agreeable paper, Stephen Turner and George Mazur commit, however, the 
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same error which they otherwise criticize: namely to single out one author as the influential 
figure for Morgenthau despite a lack of textual evidence in Morgenthau’s writings them-
selves. In their case it is Max Weber. On the other hand, it is hard to understand why Turner 
and Mazur, while looking for these kind of influences on Morgenthau, neglect Karl Mann-
heim even though his influence is most obvious when Morgenthau adopts and endorses 
Mannheim’s concept of Standortgebundenheit. 
16  See hereto Morgenthau’s early lectures on Aristotle in the 1947 winter term at the Universi-
ty of Chicago (especially that of 20th February) where he understands realism, rationalism, 
and empiricism (also idealism) as epistemologies while realism means for him primarily the 
social, political, and historical contextualization of theory and agency instead of the analysis 
of, and action in, reality due to abstract principles. 
17  See in this regard: ‘(Science) has destroyed (…) our faith in the power of reason to discover 
the truth and to demonstrate its validity. The impasse in which we find ourselves today, 
philosophically speaking, is the result of this destructive attack of science upon philosophy – 
the result of the demonstration by science that there is a truth beyond which science can dis-
cover and make plausible what philosophy cannot’ (2004: 22). 
18  With reference to his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (1946) he notes that ‘(it) must suffice 
here [i.e. 1962a] to state dogmatically that the object of social sciences is man, not as a 
product of nature but as both the creature and creator of history in and through which his in-
dividuality and freedom of choice manifest themselves’ (27). And from his Second of his 
‘Six Principles …’ we know him arguing: ‘Political realism (…) requires (…) a sharp dis-
tinction between the desirable and the possible – between what is desirable everywhere and 
at all time and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.’ 
19  Most explicit here may be Schütz and his differentiation between two levels of social ‘reali-
ty’ and respective constructions (see Schütz, Collected Papers I, The Problem of Social Re-
ality [1962]; also his The Phenomenology of the Social World [1972]). 
20  See here especially Horkheimer (1999[1937]). 
21  See One-dimensional Man, Introduction. One could here, of course, go back into the wider 
context of Marxist and neo-Marxist theory, however, for the purpose of elaborating the prin-
ciple of dialectic negation for the argument intended here, it shall suffice in this paper to re-
flect upon writings in the context of the Frankfurt School. 
22  See, of course, their Dialectic of Enlightenment.  
23  Again, this notion of dialectic could and would need to be elaborated in its historical dimen-
sions pursuing this idea in Hegel and Marx and their receptions, but as before, it’s here 
about this notion for the purpose of the argument of this paper and not about an historiog-
raphy of respective ideas. 
24  Negations, 1968: 67. 
25  This points to inner contradictions in Marcuse’s theory that – again – shall not be discussed 
here as this paper is about the notions of dialectic and negation as they are important for ar-
gument made here about the conditions of critique for which these notions are important ir-
respective of individual contradictions in specific authors. 
26  See for further discussion of both arguments below and endnote 37. 
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27  As before with regard to Marcuse, this paper is not interested in tracing the philosophical 
history, comprising the reception of ideas, above by Marcuse and here by Voegelin, but 
wants to elaborate the basic idea of, here, ‘noesis’ for its utilization for the papers’ own ar-
gument. 
28  More on this below. 
29  In this German writings Voegelin terms this ‘Spannung zum Grund’; see Anamnesis, “Was 
ist politische Realitaet?”, 1966; Engl. see Voegelin, “What is Political Reality?”, Anamnesis 
(1978). 
30  We read: ‘The tension toward the ground is the material structure of consciousness but not 
an object of propositions; rather it is a process of consciousness having degrees of transpar-
ency for itself. In the noetic experience, consciousness attains its optimum luminosity in 
which the tension toward the ground can interpret its own logos’; “What is Political Reali-
ty?” (1978: 146). 
31  See hereto the excellent analysis of Voegelin in (1999 [1938]). 
32  Voegelin’s concept of ideology evinces similarities to the understanding of Arendt and also 
Morgenthau; see Arendt (1953), (1958), (1969), (1970); Morgenthau amongst others (1944), 
(1946). 
33  We likewise read in Voegelin: ‘The noetic experience, interpreting itself, illuminates the 
logos of participation’ (1978: 154). 
34  Voegelin calls this turning away and withdrawal from humanity ‘apostrophe’ and a disease 
of mind; see Autobiographical Reflections (2006: 125-126). 
35  This norm is surprisingly similar to Derrida’s notion of ‘aporetic experience of the impossi-
ble’ (Derrida, 1993: 15), symbolized by ‘ad-vent’ and ‘event’ as what is yet to come, but 
impossible to grasp, as well as to his claim of the opening-up of spaces for these impossibili-
ties to be and to (be)come; however, Vogelin is more political in his claim, however, where-
as Derrida’s notion is more epistemological (but likewise points the way to rearticulation af-
ter deconstruction). For a more detailed discussion of Derrida in this context, see Behr, 
2014.  
36  See amongst other, Cook (2005), Haraway (1988), Hoeber-Rudolph (2005). 
37  Further discussion and literature references, see Behr, 2014. 
38  For Derrida see the discussions and further literature in Behr, 2014; for Lyotard see his La 
condition postmoderne (1979). 
39  See Galtung (1969, 1990) on structural and cultural violence. 
40  See for example, Schlosberg (2007), Dobson (1999), Rhodes (2003). 
41  With regard to the notion of hubris in relation to perspectivity and contingency of 
knowledge, see Behr and Roesch (2013). 
42  See his ‘The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil’ (1945b). 
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